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129 The observation. that curriculum innovationinvolves the importation of "new" practices
into pre-existing contexts is a banal one.
Similarly, to indicate that many of the
practical problems connected with inno-
vation derive from an incompatibility of
purpose between the "new" practice and
the setting into which it is being introduced,
is only to indicate the obvious. Such points
may be trite enough in themselves, but they
are still worth bearing in mind, and I
propose to utilise them here as starting
points for a consideration of the relationship
between design as a process and school ing as
a system of instruction and learning. It is
hoped that what such an analysis will yield
is, on the one hand, some insight into the
requirements of "design education" and, on
the other hand, a theoretical perspective for
the articulation of what is problematic about
its implementation in the classroom.
- The paper is divided into three parts. In
the first part, a general account is given of
what are taken to be some relevant features
of the schooling system. At the second part I
offer a broad analysis of the elements of the
design process and their inter-relationship.
In the third and final part, the systems
requirements of schooling are laid alongside
the process requirements of design activity,
and from this comparison is derived a
number of conclusions relating to the prob-
lem of implementing design activities within
the setting of the school.
What I want to offer first of all is a list of
those features of the schooling system that
would appear, wherever they are present, to
impinge directly upon the implementation
of a programme of design education. It is
not suggested that the present account
provides an exhaustive characterisation of
the educational system that we have. Nor is
it suggested that all schools, everywhere in
our society and for all of the time, have
associated with them all of the features here
identified. The point is simply that such
features as are isolated here are, on the
whole, prevalent enough to require that we
bear in mind the extent of their possible
influence upon innovation. That being said,
I want to maintain that there are five broad
features associated with our schooling
system, whose presence or absence is of
crucial importance for the management of
innovation in design education. The five
are:
(a) The assumption that physical and intel-
lectual activities are, to some real degree,
mutually exclusive;
(b) An institlltionalised distribution of roles
which results in the insulation of subject
teachers within their own "specialist"
areas;
(c) An institutionalised distribution of roles
which results in the learner being placed
in a subordinate positon vis-a-vis the
teacher;
(d) A perception of the content of learning
as something fundamentally divorceable
from the learner's immediate life con-
text, and consequently:
(e) A separation of the identity of the
school from the identity of the social
setting in which it is located.
Such a list is, as it stands, a little too
cryptic to be of much use, and consequently
some further clarification is necessary, Some
supporting remarks will therefore be offered
on each of these points in turn,
First, the separation between intellectual
and physical activities. Such a separation
has, of course, its roots in the classical-tradi-
tion of liberal education - and, beyond that,
in a theoretical perspective which equates
the possession of knowledge, and hence the
exercise of rationality, with a purely reflec-
tive and contemplative orientation towards
the world (1'). A part of the legacy of this
tradition is the persistent superstition that
practical activity vitiates the integrity of the
rational mind - a superstition which finds
its crudest expression in the conviction that
it is no more the business of the "thinker"
to "do" than it is the business of the "doer"
to "think". There has equally, of course, been
a persistent tradition of dissent from the
classical liberal view - an affirmation, at
least from the 17th century onwards, of the
pragmatic character of knowledge and the
practical value of learning. On the whole,
though, the spectre of a liberal education,
with its emphasis upon the cultivation of
an "abstract" and thoroughly "unworldly"
sensibility, has continued to haunt the intel-
ligence of the educator down to the present
day. (2). On the whole, the assumption that
"education" means "moulding the mind",
and that "mind" cannot be "moulded"
through mere practical activity, is one that
retains an extensive currency. The practical
consequences of this conviction are obvious
enough. Access to "education" comes to
men, primarily if not exclusively, access to a
stipulated range of intellectual enterprises.
Those who are granted access are those who
are "fitted" to meet the rigours of academic
study, while the rest, if they are provided
with anything, are provided with the conso-
lation prize of merely concrete and practical
activity (3). This separation of intellectual
and physical activity is not, nowadays, given
such a severely institutionalised expression
as it has had in the past (although it is open
to question whether comprehensive school-
ing mitigates the effects of the division or
simply masks them with the spurious unity
of a shared location) - but it persists at an
ideological level, as a conviction about what
constitutes education for certain people and
about what constitutes the alternative for
the rest. As such, the physical/mental
dichotomy is part of the "given" part of the
"setting", and hence needs to be recognised
and taken into account by anyone who is
concerned with the management of curricu-
lum change.
The insulation of "subjects" from one
another, so that areas of study become the
discrete elements of a stipulated corpus of 130
"educational knowledge", raises no special
problems in the context of the present dis-
cussion. Important issues in philosophy are,
to be sure, raised by a consideration of
whether there are grounds for maintaining
the autonomous character of the elements
which constitute the corpus (4).lt is possible,
as well, to link observations about the auto-
nomy or the inter-relatedness of areas of
study with observations concerning the
institutional character of the setting in
which study occurs (5). But neither of these
areas of debate are directly to the point here.
All that need be noted is that, whatever
impact may have been made by the move-
ment towards various types of "integration",
the content of learning is still predominantly
organised on the basis of a range of
"subjects" that it is the business of the
learner to assimilate in one form or another.
The observation that a greater or lesser pro-
portion of schools use an "integrated" time-
table does not detract from the point being
made, for integration itself often means only
that a field of common focus is chosen to
which a range of existent "subjects" contri-
bute. All that is important for our present
purpose is that: (a) so far as much of current
practice is concerned, an activity counts as
being "educational" at least partly on the
grounds that it provides access to the dif-
ferentiated contents of an already - existing
corpus of "worthwhile" knowledge, and:
(b) the movement of a programme of study,
even within an "integrated" framework, is
from the statement of a problem into which-
ever segment of the corpus is under review
(thus, one does not utilise the content of
study as a means of organising a problem -
rather one uses the problem as a means of
organising the content of study). Such a way
of organising and directing learning is, it wil
will be argued later, inimical to the require-
ments of design process, and hence hostile to
the establishment of design education.
Our third point centres on the subordinacy
of the learner. We operate, on the whole,
131 within an educational system that conformsbroadly with Friere's model of a "banking"
system. That is, status and the privilege of
action are reserved largely for the teacher,
while the learner is obliged to adopt the role
of low-status, inactive recipient of that
which is distributed by the teacher (6). The
point is not invalidated by pointing towards
the various instances of "progressive" prac-
tice that are to be found in a number of
contemporary schools. Whether the personal
relationship that exists between teacher and
taught is formal or not, and whether the
learner is given his data neat or is obliged to
"discover" it in a hidey-hole engineered by
the teacher, it remains the case that the out-
come of learning - formulated in terms of
what it is that the learner must come to
grasp - is largely determined by the teacher
and in advance of the actual enterprise of
teaching. In this activity - the delineation of
what is problematic about the encounter of
teacher and taught, and the evolution of
strategies for meeting the problems identi-
fied - the learner plays no part, and the
practical outcome of this is that, in general,
the learner functions as the "object" of the
teaching act; as something to be manipula-
ted by the teacher, either overtly (in an
"authoritarian" situation) or covertly (in a
"progressive" one). It is in this sense that
our educational practice conforms with
Friere's model of a "Banking" system. Such
an observation does not necessarily imply
criticism. It may be the case that it is the job
of teachers precisely to "manipulate" the
learners with whom they work, and a greater
or lesser degree of pre-<letermination by the
teacher, is doubtless always necessary to the
effective organisation of pedagogy. But if
one is to follow through, in teaching, the
practical requirements of design process,
then the severe subordinacy of learner to
teacher must be compromised to such a
degree that the character of the teaching
situation is recognisably transformed.
Obviously, then, the nature of the relation-
ships which hold between the various mem-
bers of a design team has to be identified
and held alongside the tendency of teacher
and taught to relate to each other in ways
that are imposed upon them by the net-
work of systematised practice in which they
operate. If there is conflict between these
two types of requirements, then we have
another basis from which to formulate an
account of what is problematic about the
implementation of design processes within
the school.
The last two points can be taken together.
We have already identified one persistent
feature of the tradition of "liberal education"
in identifying the tendency to dichotomise
physical and mental activities. A corollary
of this tendency is the commitment to a
perspective on education which sees the
"worthwhileness" of what gets "passed on"
in learning as something altogether divorced
from any consideration of immediate and
practical value. If education is about "culti-
vating the mind", '''building character", and
so on, then questions about its worth and
value are not likely to be answered in terms
of mere practical uti Iity. More: a concern
with what is practical and useful is likely to
be seen as conflicting with the requirements
of the liberal model, and is thus liable to be
met Vl(ith over hostility ~nd contempt (7).
This is not to say, of course, that the school-
ing system presents us with a spectacle of
rampant asceticism - obviously it doesn't.
But while the thread of pragmatism that is
woven into our educational tradition does
much to mitigate the effects of the liberal
ideal, it has not yet superceded it, and the
idea of education as the cultivation and per-
fection of an "inner" sensibility remains a
powerful one. Consequently, there is some
resistance to attempts to relate the content
of learning to its contexts; attempts to build-
in to learning a sense of the continuity
between what goes on inside the learner's
head as an "idea" and what goes on outside
it as a concrete and manipulable existence.
Since such a continuity - between idea and
existence - is absolutely crucial to design
activity (design, we might say, is, precisely,
a conscious organisation of the idea being
dialectic). then the tendency of the system
to resist it must obviously figure as part of
our analysis.
This gives, in very general terms, and
subject to the qual ifications indicated at the
outset, a very general summary of those
features of the schooling system that
impinge upon the implementation of design
activities in the classroom. We now need to
consider what it is that constitutes "design
activity", as a preliminary to our comparison
of design as a process with schooling as a
system of learning and instruction.
At this stage the account must become
somewhat contentious, for the analysis has
to move into areas where there is no obvious
consensus of outlook or argument. The
analysis will take its starting point from a
fairly "safe" basis, and will move from there
into a consideration of less certain areas.
The "safe" starting point is the contention
that design activity is, at centre, a problem
solving activity. While this much is so obvious
as to appear trivial, it is not easy to see very
far beyond it. Each part of this apparently
innocuous formulation generates, in fact,
fairly serious difficulties of definition. For it
is not clear, first of all, just what is to count
as an appropriate "problem" for the designer,
and nor is it clear what kinds of activity
constitute the elements of a process of
"solution-seeking". These are not gratui-
tously fostered difficulties but are, rather,
central to the theory of design. It will there-
fore be necessary to devote some attention
to them here.
There are, broadly, two ways of viewing
the designer's task. From one point of view,
the designer is a technician and nothing
more. He is given a brief and he responds to
it. He has no special stake in, or commit-
ment for, his brief; no special concern for
consequences that are not directly specified
within the terms of his assignment. He does 132
not formulate problems spontaneously or
autonomously, but only reacts to whatever
problems are put to him, ready formulated,
by the "client". He may, for example, put
all of his professional ingenuity and skill into
the production of advertising media for a
particular brand of cigarette, and then be
equally assiduous in his subsequent execution
of anti-smoking propaganda. There is no
reason why such contradictions should be a
source of worry, providing the designer is
seen simply as a technician. Similarly, the
fact that a designer may be, and often is,
called upon to organise human resources in
the pursuit of the ludicrous, the trivial, the
banal and the plain stupid, provides no cause
for concern for as long as he is seen as the
neutral instrument of the client's "needs".
From this point of view,questions concerning
the integrity of the design process or the
quality of its outcome are unaffected by
observations about the nature of the prob-
lem to which the designer addresses h!mself.
The evaluation of the outcomes of design
activity thus turns upon categories, such as
"aesthetic unity" or "functional aptitude"
or "exploitation of materials", which, while
they have an undoubted critical value, are
neutral in respect of the general character of
the problem tackled. This, then, is one kind
of perspective - perhaps the predominant
kind - on what it means to engage in the
business of design; design as an ethically-
neutral, politically-neutral, econom ically-
neutral, technical enterprise.
But there is another perspective which
runs counter to the one just indicated: the
"radical" perspective elaborated by designer/
theorists such as Fuller and Papanek. Accord-
ing to this view, the integrity of the design
process is inextricably bound up with the
character of the problem encountered.
Broadly, "problems" are here given a basis
in people's "needs", and the critical distinc-
tion is drawn between needs that, while they
may be urgently pressed, are really spurious,
133 and needs which are "authentic". Positiveand negative species of design activity are
thus, identified; needs generate problems
which are met through design; pseudo-needs
generate pseudo-problems which are met
through pseudo<lesign (8). This type of
argument is not, of course, specific to design
theory, and it has attaching to it quite severe
problems of conceptualisation (9), It is not
the purpose of this article, however, to trace
out the critical pre-suppositions attaching to
the kind of "radical" stance identified here.
All that need be noted is that a commitment
to such a stance generates consequences for
the way in which design is seen, and there-
fore for the way in which the central
features of design process are identified and
incorporated into an "educative" pro-
gramme.
Whichever of these two lines is taken, one
point is clear enough; design takes its impetus
from some ("perceived" or "received")
practical human need. Consequently, what
goes on "inside" the design process is
closely conditioned by what takes place
"outside" it. Content and Context stand,
in the end, in a relation of reciprocal deter-
minacy; the design process being modified
by a context which is itself, in part, a
product of design activity. The first general
point to be made concerning the character
of the design process is, therefore, that it
takes its starting point and direction of
movement from a context of practical need.
We are thus confronted with the implied
pedagogical requirement that a programme
of design education will be concerned, at
some stage, to sensitise its participants to
the nature of human wants. (And there is
a secondary implication lurking behind
this one; the implication that, if design is
necessary at all, then it is because existing
strategies for meeting people's requirements
are inadequate - design must, then, have
incorporated into it procedures for recog-
nising and articulating such inadequacies,
and hence design is, in a real sense, a critical
activity).
We will postpone until later the discussion
of how the stages of problem-solving activity
may be schematised so as to allow for the
evolution of appropriate strategies for the
organisation of learning. Two general points
may, however, be made at this stage; one
concerning the formal scope of the problem-
solving process (that is, the general kinds of
activity it encompasses), and one concerning
the range of "content" which may be incor-
porated into the process at any level.
Both of these aspects point towards the
same sort of consideration. In the case of the
"forma)" aspect, the main relevant obser-
vation to be made is that there are no apriori
constraints upon the kinds of activity that
may be engaged in by the designer. The assi-
milation of data relevant to the brief is, to
be sure, a part of the process of design (and
this pre-supposes that the designer is literate
in the language - mathematical, technical,
economic or whatever - in which the data is
formulated) but it is only a part. The stage
beyond data-gathering is constituted of
activities which can only be predicted,
catalogued and characterised in the broadest
sort of way; activities which centre upon the
exercise of imagination, sympathy, diplo-
macy, wit, humour, insight and all of the
other amorphous facets of creative behaviour.
And there are, manifestly, other levels still
which are dependent, not simply upon the
abstract manipulation of "ideas", but also
upon the concrete manipulation of materials
- in particular, the organisational and tech-
nical dimensions of production. Here, other
sorts of competence come into play; motor
skills, facility in technical procedures, under-
standing the properties and possibilities of
materials, a grasp of the econom ic, ergo nom ic
and psychological featu res of production
processes and an understanding of the ways
in which resources may be exploited so as to
yield an optimum balance between require-
ments in these various areas, and so on.
Since all of these - and here, obviously, the
selection is as cursory as it is random - are
dimensions of the design process, then a pro-
gramme of design education will be concerned
to explore both their inherent characteristics
and their interaction within a context of
enquiry. The implication is that no general
constraints can be placed, in advance, upon
the formal character of design process (and
this counteracts for instance, the tendency
to reduce design to something as restricted
as the "creative idea", or whatever).
A similar consideration applies to content.
Again, there are no a priori constraints upon
what might come to be seen as a "problem".
The critical perspective already indicated
does not provide grounds for the a priori
formulation of appropriate "problem con-
tents", but only a means of assessing the
value of stated contents against a shifting
background of practical need. The range of
the design problematic is therefore, in prin-
ciple, limitless. While the point is an obvious
one, it needs to be made if we are to avoid
the simplistic identification of design with
welfare cosmetics (the paint-a-pensioner's
front-door syndrome). Disadvantaged groups
within the community may, indeed, supply
the content for a design problem but, the
point is, design is not to ~e totally equated
with the life problems of low-status'or im-
poverished social groupings - it can legiti-
mately concern itself with other things as
well. And just as it is impossible to deter-
mine, in advance of the practical implemen-
tation of a design programme, just what may
or may not count as a problem, so too it is
not possible to place general constraints, in
advance, upon what is to count as an appro-
priate data source, or upon precisely what
behaviours are likely to yield useable ideas
for solutions, or upon what processes are to
be utilised in translating idea into artefact.
In all of these areas the content is determined
by the immediate requirements of a con-
tinuing process and cannot be predicted or
limited in advance through the formation of
general principles. With content as with form,
tnsn, tng ~ao~eof ~Mi~n~roem,wnlle It
always has limits in actual fact, is in princple
limitless. Design is thus an "open-ended"
research procedure. 134
Three very simple points have been made
here. First, design process has its origins in,
and develops in accordance with, a context
of practical need. Second, there are no a
priori constraints upon the formal character
of the activities which constitute design pro-
cess (it is not exclusively a "thinking"process,
for example). Thirdly, there are no a priori
constraints upon what might function as
content for the design process at any of its
levels. The concluding part of this article will
trace out some of the implications of the
juxtaposition of design process, thus charac-
terised, and the features of the schooling
system indicated earlier.
Theories diverge on the question of what
takes place when someone "solves a prob-
lem", but they tend to come together in
their identification of the broad features of
problem-solving activity and the kind of
sequence that they tend to conform to.
The "typical" sequence follows the general
pattern: Problem recognition / data review /
hypothesis formation / testing / solution.
Although the ways in which these stages are
characterised and the sub-divisions that are
made within each of them may vary some-
what, this general sequence holds good for
quite a few accounts of problem solving.
Since design is a problem solving activity,
then it too will conform to this general
pattern, and by elaborating on these basic
categories it is possible to formulate a
schematic model of the design process as a
problem-solving activity (10). All that I want
to do here is to suggest one such model, and
to compare it with an alternative derived
from the schooling context.
For our present purpose, the problem-
solving process can be broken down into ten
distinct stages. It matters little whether any
of tnese stages may be extended or conflated,
since the aim is simply to draw attention,
through them, to the range of activities and
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Research Model:
STAGE REPRESENTATIVE REPR ESENTATIVEACTIVITIES SKILLS
(1) Familiarisation Observation; Sociability, tact,
with problem area. Discussion; humour, pertinency,
Interview; watchfu Iness,
Questionnai re, tenacity, etc. .....
etc . .. .
(2) Identification Discussion, Capac ity to perceive
of particu lar analysis and relevant issues, to
problem (derivation collation of focus upon what is




(3) Preliminary All search and Ability to understand
review of data review procedures; the language (e.g.:
collation of mathematical, technical)
relevant data in which data is
from any field presented. Selectivity.
(History, Maths, A grasp of what is
Economics, the sign ificant. Abil ity
Natural Sciences, to set up connections
Politics, etc. .. .l between apparently
diverse sets of data ...
(4) Hypothesis- Dreaming, arguing, Imagination, wit,
formation. doodling, playing inventiveness,
games, reviewing humour, freedom
possibil ities, of association,
making unlikely rece,ptiveness ...
suggestions ...
(5) Preliminary Talking, drawing, Facility in
indication of demonstrating, communicating ideas
possible solution constructing th rough a range of
(or solutions) rough models and media (ability to
otherwise formulate ideas, to
representing translate ideas into
ideas. representations, to
present these in an
intelligible form, etc.l
(6) Criticism & Discussion, drawing, Ability to identify
refinement of model-building, sites of possible
preliminary game-playing ... error; willingness to
proposals. consider alternatives;
flexibility; readiness
. to admit error, to
relinquish non-productive
strategies, etc . .. .
STAKE REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTATIVEACTIVITIES SKILLS
(7) Selection of As Stage (6) Ability to review and
final solution summarise the results
on the basis of of all earlier strategies;
Stage (6) to extract a single general
line of attack from the
total complexity of
previous experience.
(8) Production A. All construction Manual skills, dexterity,
(Prototype) activities; the hand/eye co-ordination,
organisation of appreciation of the
production units; properties of materials,
technical processes understanding of
for the manipulation the effects of
of materials, etc .... organising production
in various ways, etc . .. .
(9) Testing. Usi ng the artefact, Abil ity to formulate
discussing its use pertinent questions; to
with the client, assimilate criticism; to
etc . .. . modify existing ideas ...
(10) Production B. As Stage (8) As Stage (8)
(Final Result)
What this model is intended to provide is,
primarily, some indication of the scope and
complexity of the design process. The activi-
ties engaged in range from highly specialised
and controlled enterprises (for instance, pro-
duction techniques) to activities that are
"open-ended" and have a fairly amorphous
character (for instance, the preliminary,
tentative moves towards framing the ele-
ments of a solution). Skills, similarly, range
from the highly specifiable, such as those
involved in construction work, to skills, such
as that of "sociability", which are only open
to the loosest sort of definition. Some activi-
ties depend upon the individual working in
temporary isolation from other members of
the project team, while others are group
activities which depend upon co-operation
and inter-action between a number of people.
And there are other dimensions to the pro-
cess of problem solving than those that have
already been cursorily indicated here. The
high Iy differentiated character of the pro-
cess carries implications for, for example,
the way in which contact between teacher
and taught comes to be organ ised. A whole
range of possibilities become accessible, from
large group sessions to individual tutorials,
and from "formal" teaching to "informal"
methods, for organising the confrontation
between tutor and learner. All that matters
here, however, is that some indication
should be given of the highly complex and
differentiated character of the problem-
solving process - a complexity and a degree
of differentiation that has to be recognised
and assimilated to teaching practice if that
practice is to be at all adequate.
A wholly different sort of picture emerges
if we move in the opposite direction - if we
move, not from a consideration of design
requirements to a model of education, but
from a consideration of schooling require-
ments to a model of design activity. The
immediately striking thing about the move-
ment in this direction is that it results in a
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137 vitiated and cramped realisation of designprocess. The operation of systems constraints
has, in general, an ennervating effect upon
process; paring down the richness and com-
plexity of the problem-solving enterprise to
the routinised and banal enactment of pro-
duction techniques. It is not difficult to see
why this should be so. The dichotomy
between "physical" and "mental" activities
destroys the continuity that exists, in our
"ideal" process, between research and inven-
tiveness on the one hand, and productive
activities on the other. Thus, the "production
of objects" within the "system" (j.e. in the
school workshop) tends to be seen as the
outcome, not of "thought-proper", but
simply of physical action. Consequently,
the skills and techniques attaching to pro-
duction are limited to the technical aspects
of manipulating materials. The design process
is restricted, in the first place, to simple
physical production (and I therefore call the
alternative, systems, model a "Production"
model).
Other restrictive consequences are not
difficult to identify. The insulation of
subject from subject strengthens the concen-
tration upon production as the enactment of
a technical process. And this insulation
results not only in a failure to realise the
conti nuity between productive techniques
and "thought activity", but also in a failure
to grasp the connectedness between the
outcomes of production techniques (j.e. the
artefact) and a specific and "external" con-
text of need. In many cases, indeed, there is
no "external" need; the initiating "needs"
are the "internal" ones that an injunction be
followed or that a technique be illustrated -
the artefact has, otherwise, a quite arbitrary
and gratuitous existence. Lastly, the partici-
pants mode of activity is generally limited to
that of giver or receiver of information - the
teacher stipulates the course of action that he
wants followed, and the pupils act accord-
ingly. This too, obviousl y, falls a good
deal short of the diversity or activity and
experience which is associated with our
"ideal" model. To summarise then: the
"production" model interprets the manu-
facture of artefacts in basically technical
terms, allows little scope for any interplay
between "technical" and "other" activities,
and tends to be associated with a predomi-
nantly didactic style of teaching. The problem
of bringing about change in design education
is, in the end, the problem of making the
transition from a "production" to a
"research" situation the preceding
remarks have been intended to give some
indication of what this switch in emphasis
involves.
The interpretation of the problem of
innovation in terms of a conflict between
"system" and "process" is deliberate. The
analysis of process (the character of design
activity in this case) reveals a particular set
of requirements, while the analysis of
"system" reveals other requirements, largely
inimical to the realisation of the idealised
model. To some extent this must always be
so; ideal and actuality seldom coincide in
any case. But in the case of design education,
the point is, the lack of coincidence is exten-
sive and radical. The inference is that the
implementation of a programme of design
education (of a type that is faithful to the
actual requirement of design activity) entails
changes, and fundamental ones, being made in
the character of the system which puts the
programme into practice. It is the resistance
of the system to change that constitutes the
general character of what is problematic
about curriculum innovation.
What underlies the argument of this paper
is a conviction that curriculum innovation
does not, in an important sense, depend
merely upon the modification of "personal"
desires and expectations. The problem of
innovation is not simply to stop people
thinking in one way and to encourage them
to think in another - which is only another
way of saying that the problem of inno-
vation is not exclusively a problem of
psychological motivation (111. Itisaproblem
that has to do, as well, with changing the
institutional context which regulates educa-
tional practice so as to allow for the most
adequate realisation of the ideas and inten-
tions behind the "new" practice at which
innovation aims. Where the discrepancy
between the requirements of the "new"
practice and the character of the existing
system is great (as, I have argued here, is the
case with design education), then the prob-
lems of innovation will be correspondingly
severe, quite independently of the desires
and aspirations of the individuals who
administer the system. It therefore becomes
necessary that we should be in possession of
theoretical perspectives which are capable of
articulating fully such a discrepancy and of
generating strategies for the reduction of
the tensions inherent in it. This paper has
not been exhaustive enough to qualify as
providing such a perspective, but it does,
hopefully, indicate something of the extent
to which the dislocation between the process
requirements of design and the systems
characteristics of schooling might constitute
an obstacle to the realisation of curriculum
change. A switch in attention, from the psy-
chological to the structural attributes of the
context of innovation, is, I would argue,
necessary to a proper understanding of the
scope and actual function of design educa-
tion in a "schooling" context.
(1) See, for example, Habermas, J.: Knowledge
and Human Interests, Beacon Press, 1971.
p.301 ff.
(2) "As I see it, the central objectives of educa-
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